Education, Demographics and the Irish Economic Miracle by Hamilton, Rob
Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
103
Education,  Demographics  and 
the Irish  Economic  Miracle
By Rob Hamilton, CBFSAI
* and Bank of England
ABSTRACT
This paper considers how changes in the educational and age composition
of the Irish population between 1994 and 2003 have affected employment,
unemployment and the supply potential of the economy. The impact of
demographic change on the labour market is estimated to have been
relatively small. In contrast, up to a quarter of the decline in the
unemployment rate, and two thirds of the increase in the employment
rate, could reflect the rise in educational attainment. This rise is also largely
responsible for estimated labour quality increasing by 1.4 per cent per year.
Together, labour quality and employment growth can account for 2.1
percentage points of the 4.7 per cent average annual growth of GNP per
adult over the past decade — leaving relatively little room for an economic
miracle.
1. Introduction
This paper considers how educational and demographic changes
have affected employment, unemployment and the average
quality of the workforce in Ireland. Interest in factors affecting
employment and unemployment is self-evident, because of their
implications for equality and wider macro-economic
performance. Labour quality is also of vital importance, as it
affects the potential output of the economy. And understanding
recent changes in potential output may help in the forecast of
future growth, and its likely trade-off with inflation.
Data considerations limit this paper to developments between
1994 and 2003. Although short, this period coincides with an
almost miraculous upturn in Ireland’s economic fortunes. On the
official measure, unemployment fell from 14.7 per cent in 1994
to 4.4 per cent in 2003 (Figure 1). Over this period, the
employment rate increased from 45.4 per cent to 56.9 per cent
(Figure 2). This reflected annual employment growth of 4.2 per
cent, almost three times the growth rate of the adult population.
On the output side, GNP growth averaged 6.6 per cent per year,
compared with its average rate of 4.1 per cent since 1980. But
despite the fall in unemployment and the rapid economic
expansion, inflation generally remained low and stable, averaging
3.1 per cent between 1994 and 2003 (Figure 3). In latter years,
this may partly have reflected discipline associated with
*I would like to thank Richard Barwell, Frank Browne, Karl Whelan and seminar participants
at the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, and the Bank of England, for
useful suggestions. However, the views expressed in this paper are the personal responsibility
of the author and are not necessarily held by the CBFSAI, the ESCB, Bank of England or the
MPC. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. Email contact:
Robert.Hamilton@bankofengland.co.uk.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
104
membership of the Euro. However, inflation was also in low in
1994 and 1995, before membership was confirmed, and despite
the sharp pick-up in growth.
As discussed in more detail in Walsh (2004), the resurgence of
fortunes in the labour market over the 1990s followed the gloom
of the 1980s. Over that decade, employment fell by an average
of 0.5 per cent per year. Data from the ESRI suggest that the
unemployment rate rose from 7.0 per cent in 1979 to peak at
17.2 per cent in 1987. And the increasing share of long-term
unemployment had led to a belief that this rise was mirrored in
the natural rate: Layard et al (1991) estimated that this had
increased from 9 per cent in the 1970s to 13 per cent over the
1980s. Inactivity had also risen, as had net outward migration.
Almost as remarkable as the pick-up over the 1990s has been
the resilience of the labour market to the recent economic
slowdown. Despite GNP growth slowing from over 10 per cent
in 2000 to almost zero in 2002, unemployment remained steady
at around 4 per cent. As noted by Walsh (2004), many observers
had previously predicted that any downturn would be met with
a sharp increase in unemployment. And, as recently as 1999, the
NAIRU had been estimated to be 9 per cent (McMorrow and
Roeger, 2000).
Barry (1999) and Fitzgerald (1999) provide a comprehensive
discussion of many of the factors that are likely to have been
behind Ireland’s economic transformation. These include: the
long-term benefits from the fiscal stabilisation of the late 1980s;
European structural funds (which are estimated to have
contributed about 0.5 percentage points to annual GDP growth
over the 1990s); increased educational attainment improving the
skill level of the workforce; favourable demographic shifts;
continued Irish success in attracting Foreign Domestic
Investment inflows; and peaceful labour relations leading to
wage moderation.
This paper does not seek to contribute to the debate on the
relative importance of all these factors. Instead, it focuses on the
roles played by educational and demographic changes. In doing
so, it builds on the results of Durkan et al (1999), who found that
the increase in educational attainment raised labour quality (i.e.
human capital) by about 0.9 per cent per year over the first half
of the 1990s, but by only 0.5 percentage points over the 1970s
and 1980s.
This paper extends the calculation of labour quality to 2003, and
uses a different data source that enables a more flexible and
accurate analysis, albeit at the expense of a shorter reference
period. Durkan and co-authors used census data for 1981 andQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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1991, with the results extrapolated to 1996 using statistics on
participation levels in education. In addition to removing the
need for extrapolation, the labour force surveys used in this
paper enable a joint evaluation of the effects of demographic
and educational change on labour quality. They also allow labour
quality growth to be decomposed into three factors: changes
in the prevalence of different types of worker, changes in their
employment rates, and changes in their average hours. More
practical advantages are that up to five (rather than three)
educational categories can be considered, while more recent
wage data are also used. In addition to considering labour
quality, this paper also estimates how changing demographics
and educational attainment have affected the rates of
unemployment, employment and potential output growth.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
discusses the data sources used in the paper. Section 3 describes
recent demographic and educational trends in Ireland. Section 4
estimates the effect of demographic change on the
unemployment and employment rates. Section 5 considers the
effects on these rates of educational changes. Section 6 evaluates
how these trends have affected the skill composition of the
workforce, and thus potential output while Section 7 calculates
the effect on economic growth. Section 8 concludes.
2. Data
This paper uses both aggregate and micro level data. Aggregate
National Accounts and labour market data were obtained from
the Central Statistics Office (CSO), while the individual level data
were sourced through the Irish Social Science Data Archive
(ISSDA), although the surveys were originally conducted by the
CSO.
Individual level labour market data were obtained from the
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for 1998-2003,
and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 1994-1997. The QNHS is
a random nationwide survey and is used in the production of the
official labour force statistics, including the measures of
employment and unemployment. Each quarter, it surveys about
39,000 households, which equates to a sample of about 80,000
individuals aged 15 or over (which are hereafter referred to as
adults). The QNHS replaced the annual LFS, which covered
approximately 115,000 adults. This paper uses variables that are
present in both surveys, with the results made representative of
the general population by using the CSO’s grossing factors.
Although the LFS and QNHS surveys are similar in design, two
steps have been taken to ensure comparability of the results. As
the LFS was conducted in April of each year, this paper only uses
the second quarter QNHS waves to avoid seasonal distortions.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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It also uses the PES (Principal Economic Status) classification of
labour market activity, which is available from both surveys. This
is a slightly different to the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) definitions, which are now used in the official labour
market statistics. However, these data were not collected in the
LFS survey and the PES variable is used throughout to avoid any
discontinuities. Differences between the two arise because the
ILO classifies people on the basis of their experience in the week
before the survey, while the PES asks respondents for their own
assessment of their economic status. In practice, the differences
between the two measures of the unemployment and
employment rates are small (Figures 1 and 2), and the
conclusions from using the PES survey are transferable to the
official series. The small differences in the levels of
unemployment arise because the PES measure includes people
who describe themselves as unemployed, but who are not
sufficiently active in the labour market to be categorised as
unemployed on the ILO measure. The adoption of the ILO
measure (with the introduction of the LFS) marginally increased
the official measure of employment, which the CSO (1997)
attribute to the higher number of individuals classified as either
employed by relatives or in part-time work.
In addition to information on labour market status from the
QNHS and the LFS surveys, this paper also uses wage data from
the 1999/2000 and the 1994/1995 waves of the Household
Budget Survey (HBS). These surveys each include details on a
random sample of around 7,500 households. Although the HBS
is conducted at the household level, this paper uses series that
separately identify the wage, age and gender of the head of
household and their spouse/partner.
Section 6 below uses the average wage for groups of workers
defined on the basis of gender, age (categorised in 6 groups) and
educational attainment (split in up to 5 levels). In practice, the
HBS had few observations for some combinations, making their
average wage subject to considerable measurement uncertainty.
Thus, the wage data were smoothed by making the assumption
that hourly wages are determined by age, education, gender and





























a refers to the age group,
e the educational
level and
g the gender. The dummy variables (Dx) take the value
1 if the individual is in group x and are zero otherwise. ε
j is the
idiosyncratic component, which is assumed to be randomlyQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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distributed and independent of the other factors. Table A1 in the
Appendix gives the results from this regression equation.
Comparison of Figures 4 and 5 reveals that the smoothed results
are very similar to average actual wages, with the main difference
being that there is no dip in the wage for those with primary/no
education between the 15-19 and 20-24 age categories. Once
smoothed wages by education, age and gender were calculated,
these values were merged into the QNHS and LFS datasets. In
practice, the results presented in Section 6 were virtually
identical to using the unsmoothed data.
3. Trends in the Demographic and Educational
Composition
Ireland has experienced significant demographic shifts between
1994 and 2003. Of particular importance for the purposes of this
paper has been the 2.5 percentage points fall in the proportion
of the population aged between fifteen and nineteen. This has
been offset by an increase in the relative sizes of the 25-34 and
the 55-64 age groups (Figure 6). However, especially by
European standards, Ireland’s population remains skewed
towards the young, with over 20 per cent of the 15+ population
aged 15-24: Ireland will continue to experience demographic
change over the next few decades as this cohort ages.
Changes in the average educational attainment of the adult
population over the past decade have been even more marked.
In particular, the fraction whose highest qualification is at third
level or above more than doubled to 31 per cent (Figure 7),
which was mainly offset by a reduction in the proportion of those
whose highest qualification is at lower secondary level or below.
1
In addition to the role played by migrants, these trends reflect
two purely domestic factors. First, the decline in the 15-19
population reduced the proportion who are too young to have
reached their highest educational level. And second, young
cohorts, with relatively high educational levels, are replacing
older ones, with relatively low ones (Figure 8). This cohort effect
is evident in the school leaving statistics: the percentage of
students who achieve a Leaving Certificate increased from 20
per cent in 1965 to 82 per cent in 2000, while the estimated
rate of transfer to third level increased from 11 per cent to 57
per cent (Figure 9).
The increase in educational attainment at least partly reflects
changes in government policy. The single most important
contribution over the past thirty years was probably the
introduction of free secondary level education in 1967 (Kearney,
1 The lower secondary level reflects the Junior Leaving Certificate (typically taken at age
15/16); the upper secondary level is the Leaving Certificate (age 17/18); and third level
education is provided by Universities, Institutes of Technology and Colleges of Education.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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1999). But an indication of the importance attached to
educational policy over more recent years is that eleven pieces
of primary and secondary legislation were passed between 1926
and 1988, but four times as many were passed between 1989
and 2003. Recent legislation included the 2000 educational
welfare act, which raised the minimum school leaving age from
15 to 16 (or until students have completed three years of second
level education). Another significant change was the introduction
in 1989 of the Leaving Certificate Vocational Programme (LCVP),
and its expansion in 1994. The, yet more practical, ‘‘Leaving
Certificate Applied Programme’’ was introduced in 1995, which
aims to prepare participants for adult and working life through
general education, vocational training and vocational
preparation. It was designed for those whose needs were not
adequately catered for by the other courses, and thus was
intended to raise the proportion remaining in education
(Department of Education, 2004).
In addition to purely domestic changes, the composition of the
population has also been influenced by migration. There have
been net migratory inflows into Ireland since the mid 1990s,
following net outflows over the 1980s (Figure 10). Between 1994
and 2003, average annual gross inflows were equivalent to 1.4
per cent of the resident population, while gross outflows
averaged 0.7 per cent.
According to the QNHS and LFS surveys, the non-Irish born
fraction of the population increased from 5.4 per cent in 1994
to 9.4 per cent in 2003. This implies that these immigrants have
accounted for about a third of recent gross inward migration.
These migrants have a greater propensity to be of prime working
age range (25-44) than the domestic population (Figure 11). Their
average educational attainment is also higher, being over fifty
percent more likely to have a degree (Figure 12). However, their
relatively low overall weight means that they account for only
1 percentage point of the 16 percentage points increase in the
fraction educated to third level over the past decade, and for an
even smaller amount of the demographic changes. Of course,
the composition of immigrants has, to some extent, reflected the
demand for highly skilled workers, so these changes are partly
endogenous.
We only have limited information on the composition of the
migratory flows of the Irish born, who account for around two
thirds of gross inward migration over the period studied in this
paper. This means that we are unable to quantify their influence
on the aggregate changes in the levels of education attainment
and demographics. Barrett and O’Connell (2001), using data for
1994-1996, found that the returning Irish were twice as likely
to have a degree as the domestic population. However, IrelandQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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emigrants are also much better educated than average. The pick-
up in the volume of educated returning Irish may therefore
roughly offset the brain drain from educated Irish emigrants,
which had previously suppressed average educational levels in
Ireland.
More generally, outward and return migration are thought to
have played a major role in shaping the Irish labour market since
independence. As discussed in Walsh (2004), high labour
mobility between Ireland and the UK ensured that the
unemployment rates of the two countries tended to move in
tandem. Honahan (1992) found that the equilibrium gap
between the Irish and UK unemployment rates was around 5 per
cent. However, this relationship has now broken down, with the
unemployment rates in Ireland and the UK in 2003 comparable
at slightly under 5 per cent.
4. Demographic Trends and Labour Market
Outcomes
Unemployment and employment rates vary significantly by age
in Ireland (Tables 1 and 2, and Figures 13 and 14). Employment
rates are relatively low amongst the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups,
many of whom remain in education. They pick-up sharply for the
25-34 age group, before gradually declining with age. For those
who have left education, unemployment rates among the 15-19
and, to a lesser extent, the 20-24 age groups are relatively high.









Sources: QNHS, LFS and author’s calculations. Derived from PES classification.









Sources: QNHS, LFS and author’s calculations. Derived from PES classification.
By identity, the aggregate unemployment rate is the weighted
average of the unemployment rates of all the separate ageQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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groups. Thus, the reduction in the proportion of the young
between 1994 and 2003 might have helped reduce (increase)
the aggregate rates of unemployment (employment). Defining
the share of each group as s










So aggregate changes in the unemployment rate can be
decomposed into movements in the rate of the different age-
groups (shift) and changes in their relative size (share):






















In doing this, we follow previous authors including Perry (1970),
Summers (1986), Shimer (1998) and Barwell (2000). Note that
this analysis does not consider the details of how jobs are being
formed, nor why others have been lost. Instead, it assumes that
the demand for labour adjusts to variation in the supply. Implicit
in such an analysis, and that used in section 5, is that there is
some measure of the natural rate of unemployment that
depends, amongst other things, on the age and educational
composition of the population.
But, before undertaking this decomposition, it is necessary to
consider why the young tend to have higher unemployment, and
thus whether the downward ‘‘share’’ effect on aggregate
unemployment caused by a reduction in the proportion of the
young would be offset by a ‘‘shift’’ effect of higher group specific
unemployment rates. Of course, there would be no such offset
if the labour markets for different age groups are effectively
segmented.
One factor behind the higher rate of unemployment amongst the
young is that they are more likely to leave employment. Drawing
upon the UK experience (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995), this is
likely to reflect their greater likelihood of being laid off, and their
greater propensity to quit their jobs without alternative
employment. As discussed in more detail in Barwell (2000), their
greater rate of lay offs may be due in part to some firms
operating on a ‘‘last-in, first-out’’ basis, which disproportionately
affects young workers. Employers may also prefer to lay-off their
youngest workers because they have less firm-specific human
capital, or because they may expect them to be more likely to
leave at some time in the future. Part of the explanation for
young people being more likely to quit their jobs is that they are
more concentrated in low-wage industries, which tend to have
higher quit rates. In addition, they may ‘‘job-shop’’ until they findQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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a job that is suitable for them. Such a process naturally means
that older workers have more job stability, because they have
already undergone this sorting process.
A reduction in the proportion of young individuals might be
expected to lower aggregate unemployment if the job shopping
and/or firm-specific human capital factors are the most important
explanations for the age-unemployment relationship. But if it
instead reflects ‘‘first-in, last-out’’ policies other workers would
instead be the first to be laid-off, with no change in aggregate
unemployment. Total unemployment would also probably be
unchanged if it reflects the concentration of the young in low-
wage industries — unless the demand for such workers is
modified alongside the change in the age structure of the
population. Given that it is difficult to know the relative
importance of the different factors, the results from an analysis
of shifts in the share of different age groups provides an upper
bound for the impact of demographic change. In addition to
mirroring trends in unemployment, variation in employment rates
by age group also reflects inactivity.
Shift-share analysis reveals that demographic trends can account
for a maximum of only 0.2 percentage points of the 9.4
percentage points fall in the unemployment rate between 1994
and 2003 (Figure 15).
2 Instead, the vast majority of the change
reflects the decline in the unemployment rate within each age
group. The relatively small contribution from the reduction in the
proportion of the high-unemployment 15-19 group is because
their low activity rate means that they only have a small effect
on aggregate unemployment. These results suggest a less
important role for demographic trends in explaining the
reduction in unemployment in Ireland than was found for the
UK: Barwell (2000) found that demographics accounted for a
tenth of the 5.7 percentage points fall in the UK unemployment
rate between 1984 and 1998.
However, demographic shifts are estimated to have made a
more substantial contribution to the increase in the employment
rate in Ireland, accounting for up to 1.1 percentage points of the
9.6 percentage points increase (Figure 16). By identity, the bigger
increase in employment than fall in unemployment is because of
the downward effect on inactivity. This is unsurprising: the
inactivity rate among the 15-19 group is high because many
remain in education, so a reduction in the size of this group will
tend to reduce aggregate inactivity. Thus, demographics may
have an important effect on employment, even if the impact on
unemployment is quite limited.
2 The effect of changes in the relative size of groups is given by: Σ 0.5*∆ Sa(Ua,t + Ua,t-l). Where
Ua is the unemployment rate of group a and Sa is it share. Age groups were: 15-19, 20-24,
25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+ .Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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5. Educational Changes and Labour Market
Outcomes
Unemployment rates are lower amongst the more educated
groups in Ireland (Figure 17), while employment rates are higher
(Figure 18). This is a trend common to 29 out of 30 OECD
countries covered in OECD (2004).
3 But, as with demographic
changes, it is important to understand the potential explanations
for this relationship before concluding that the rise in educational
standards discussed above has lowered aggregate
unemployment.
A necessary — but not sufficient — condition for rising
educational standards to reduce unemployment is that education
provides skills that are valued in the labour market. Becker’s
(1964) seminal contribution argues that this is the case, as
education facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge and skills
that lead to an increase in human capital. However, a competing
explanation for the positive relationship between education and
earnings (shown in Figure 4) is that educational attainment
merely enables individuals to provide a signal of their underlying
ability. In this case, employers only care about the relative —
rather than absolute — level of education of potential employees,
as this enables them to detect high ability a percentage
pointslicants. In this case, a shift towards a more educated
workforce would be unlikely to have real effects on productivity,
wages or aggregate unemployment.
As discussed in Card (2001), the methodological difficulties in
distinguishing between the competing explanations are severe.
This partly reflects identification problems, and the technical (and
ethical) difficulties of conducting formal experiments. Amongst
the most reliable studies include those conducted on twins
(including Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994) or using other natural
experiments. Drawing on these results, Patrinos and
Psacharopoulos’s (2002) review concludes that the evidence
from micro data studies has now ‘‘established beyond any
reasonable doubt that there are tangible and measurable returns
to investment in education’’. Pooling the results for 40 countries,
they estimate that the average increase in wages associated with
another year of schooling is about 10 percent. Unsurprisingly,
they also find that as the supply of education increases, the return
falls.
There is a less extensive literature on the relationship between
education and unemployment or employment. One of the
reasons given by Mincer (1991) for the lower rate of lay-offs
among the more educated in the US is that they tend to undergo
3 The exception was Korea, where the unemployment rate for those with tertiary education
was 3.0 per cent but was 2.1 per cent for those whose highest qualification was less than
upper secondary.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
113
more extensive ‘‘on-the-job’’ training and therefore tend to
acquire more firm-specific human capital. So when it comes to a
choice between laying-off a worker who has been invested in
more heavily, or one less heavily, firms naturally choose the
latter, who also has a lower level of education. If education and
on-the-job training are complements (as proposed by Becker,
1964), a rise in educational standards would be expected to lead
to an aggregate increase in training. As discussed in OECD
(2004), this could lead to an overall reduction in unemployment.
4
Mincer also finds that the relatively high cost of hiring educated
workers means that firms are more reluctant to fine-tune the
number of such workers during cyclical fluctuations. In addition,
education may improve the ability of individuals to ‘‘job-match’’.
This may be because they have greater awareness of their own
skills and/or because they tend to be more willing to migrate
to find suitable employment. Within the language of a standard
‘‘matching model’’ of the labour market (Layard et al, 1991),
greater ability to job match translates into an increase in the
effectiveness of job-search and a decline in the equilibrium
unemployment rate.
In addition to being less likely to be made unemployed, Mincer
(1991) also found that the more educated tend to have shorter
unemployment durations. This may be because the cost of
becoming unemployed is greater, due to larger foregone
earnings, so that they search harder for new work. Relatedly,
unemployment amongst the more educated appears to have a
larger subsequent negative effect on future earnings growth. A
different explanation is that the better educated may be more
efficient at accumulating information, and thus be more effective
at finding a suitable new job. Greater flexibility in working hours
and practices may also increase their ability for on-the-job-search,
meaning that they do not have to quit before finding alternative
work. The more educated may also have a larger range of career
options available to them, which may effectively increase the
supply of available labour for a given amount of unemployment.
The standard matching model predicts that this would reduce
aggregate unemployment.
Most of these explanations for the education-unemployment
relationship suggest that an increase in educational attainment
could lead to a reduction in the aggregate unemployment rate.
However, there is little consensus in the literature on whether
shift-share quantification of this effect is valid. Summers (1986)
argues that although it may ‘‘overestimate the true effect . . . the
overestimate may not be large’’. In contrast, Shimer (1998)
4 The OECD (2004) find that the incidence of training can explain up to 40 per cent of the
cross-country variation in employment rates, even after controlling for education, GDP
growth and institutional structure. Possible explanations for this are that expected wages
are higher, that workers with more human capital are more adaptable to change, or that
the relative attractiveness of unemployment falls if wages increases are not matched by
increased unemployment benefits.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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argues that such demographic adjustments are ‘‘extremely
misleading’’. This was based upon his belief that employers
mainly care about the relative (and not absolute) level of
education of potential employees, as this provides a signal of
their ability. However, Walsh (2004) and Lemieux and Card
(2001) assume that changes in the share of different groups have
no effect on the group unemployment rates.
We argue that there are a number of reasons for believing that
the results from shift-share analysis are likely to be informative,
particularly for Ireland. First, there is an increasing consensus in
the literature that the significant returns to education do not
solely reflect ability bias (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2002):
thus, education does provide skills that are valued in the labour
market. Second, most of the explanations for the education-
unemployment relationship discussed above suggest that a rise
in educational standards could reduce aggregate unemployment.
Third, Shimer’s skepticism was partly based upon his finding that
the fall in the relative size of the lowest education group in the
US had been accompanied by a significant increase in their
relative unemployment rate: he attributed this to the average
ability of the lowest educated group falling, as all but the least
able increased their educational attainment. However, such an
effect is not apparent in Ireland. Indeed, the fall in unemployment
rates was remarkably consistent across the different educational
groups in Ireland (Figure 17) while the relative employment rates
remained very little changed (Figure 18). This remarkable pattern
suggests that the demand for different worker types has adjusted
in line with supply and/or that the characteristics of these
educational groups have remained reasonably constant over
time. Fourth, and relatedly, the relative wage of different
educational groups remained extremely stable between 1992/3
and 1999/2000.
5 If workers are paid in proportion to their
marginal product, this implies that their average relative
productivity has remained constant. Fifth, and finally, the average
educational attainment in the Irish population remains well
below that in the US. For example, in 2001, 57.6 per cent of
the Irish population aged 25-64 had at least upper secondary
education, compared with 87.7 per cent for the US (OECD,
2004). This suggests there is less chance of the level of education
in Ireland having reached the point where it no-longer provides
a genuine boost to individuals’ human capital.
Shift-share analysis reveals that changes in the proportion of
different educational groups has caused up to a 2.0 percentage
points reduction in the unemployment rate between 1994 and
2003 (Figure 19). This has been driven by the fall in the number
of those educated to lower secondary level or below, who tend
5 Although we have no data on the wage distribution in 2003, the shift in educational
composition between 1992/3 and 1999/2000 was much more sizeable than between
1999/2000 and 2003.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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to have relatively high unemployment rates.
6 An alternative
calculation is to hold group specific unemployment rates at their
1994 values and evaluating the effect of the shares changing as
they did. This boosts the effect to 2.5 percentage points.
The effect on employment is estimated to have been even more
substantial, with the increase in educational attainment
accounting for up to 6.1 percentage points of the 9.6 percentage
points rise (Figure 20). The alternative calculation marginally
increases this effect to 6.3 percentage points. The more
important role in raising employment than reducing
unemployment arises because of the downward effect on
inactivity, which is more prevalent amongst the less educated.
A final issue is that, although the increase in educational
attainment may have been necessary for the rise in employment,
the driver for this change may have partly been an exogenous
increase in the demand for skilled workers. This is because the
level of education is, at least to some extent, endogenously
determined and changing labour market conditions vary the
incentives to remaining in education. However, it seems unlikely
that changing labour market conditions can fully explain the
change in the educational choices of domestic residents. In
particular, while the modest increase in the wage premium
associated with having a degree might have encouraged some
to continue their studies, the decline in the unemployment rates
of the less educated groups probably reduced the incentives to
others in remaining in education. As discussed earlier, although
labour market conditions also affect the level, and type, of
immigration and emigration this only seems capable of
accounting for part of the overall rise in standards.
6. The Effect of Educational and Demographic
Changes on Labour Quality
This section estimates the impact of changes in the educational
and age composition of the workforce on labour input. This is
important because hours worked are not homogeneous. Instead,
their quality depends on the characteristics of the job and the
person — including innate ability, training, education,
responsibility and experience.
Following Jorgenson et al (1987), the average skill level of the
workforce can be summarised in a labour quality index. This
weights together the number of hours worked by different types
of individual who vary by observable characteristics that are likely
to be related to their productivity. Following these authors, the
characteristics used in this paper are age (which can be thought
6 Note that the increase in the size of the ‘‘third level’’ educational group means that their
‘‘share’’ effect gives a positive contribution to the unemployment rate. But this is more than
offset by the effects from the decline in size of other groups.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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of as proxying experience), educational attainment and gender.
7
The index does not measure the effect of labour augmenting
technological progress. Therefore, an hour worked by a female
worker, aged 25 with upper secondary education represents the
same quality of labour input in 1994 as it does in 2003.
As the productivity of different types of workers cannot be
observed directly, it is inferred in the construction of the index
by assuming that it is proportional to their gross hourly wage.
This would automatically be the case in a perfectly competitive
labour market, as all workers would receive a wage equal to their
marginal product. However, it also applies in the less restrictive
setting where relative wages are proportional to relative
productivity.
More formally, the effective labour input (input) of worker j at
time t is assumed to be proportional to their hourly wage (w)
scaled up by the hours that they work (h).
input
j





In practice, the labour quality index is constructed by summing
over groups defined on the basis of age (a), education (e) and
gender (g). Dividing by total labour input gives the share of


















The wage bill for each group is calculated by taking their average
hourly wage from the HBS and multiplying up by the average
usual number of hours worked by that type of worker from the
LFS/QNHS surveys. Usual, rather than actual, hours were chosen
because they are less volatile, although the results are robust to
using actual hours.
Quality adjusted hours are defined as the sum of the hours
worked by each group, weighted by their relative wage bill share:









7 The inclusion of a gender variable is common to previous studies of labour quality. It does
not try to measure innate skill differences between male and female workers, or sexual
discrimination. Instead it is also likely to capture a range of other effects including different
average job tenures of male and female workers, different occupational choices etc. etc.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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Dividing by aggregate hours (H) gives average quality per hour
(Qt):










In the absence of annual wage data, this paper uses relative wage
data from the 1999/2000 HBS. Implicitly, it is assumed that this
gives a good approximation to average relative wages between
1994 and 2003. In addition to, somewhat fortuitously, being
almost in the middle of the sample period, the validity of this
assumption is supported by relative wages having changed very
little between 1994/5 and 1999/2000 (Figure 4). And, as
discussed below, the results are virtually unchanged by the use
of the earlier set of wage data, indicating that the results are
robust to modest changes in wages.
After simplifying the notation so that superscript i represents
each combination of age, education and gender, the log growth
rate of labour quality is given by:










• Ht − 1
Ht
(equation 2)
This equation reveals that labour quality increases if high wage
groups increase their share of hours, with changes magnified by
greater variation in wages.
Figure 4 shows how wages vary by educational level and age in
Ireland. As discussed above, average wages rise with education.
They also initially increase with age, before peaking with the 45-
54 age group and declining slightly thereafter. The initial increase
may reflect productivity gains due to increased experience.
Explanations for the decline amongst the oldest workers include
sample composition effects (higher rates of retirement amongst
the more skilled) and older workers being less quick at adapting
to new skills (Skirbeckk, 2003).
Movements in labour quality can also be decomposed into
changes in the size of each skill group in the population (n
i),
changes in their employment rates (e
i) and changes in the
average hours per job of each type of worker (a
i):
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Using this methodology, labour quality in Ireland is calculated to
have increased by 13.6 per cent between 1994 and 2003,
equivalent to an average annual rate of 1.4 per cent (Table 3).
This mainly (12.6 percentage points) reflects the greater
prevalence of relatively high skill groups in the population.
Changes in their relative employment rates have made a very
small negative contribution (− 0.4 percentage points), as there has
been a slightly larger increase in employment among the lower
skill groups. This effect is unsurprising given the rapid economic
expansion, as it is likely that firms increasingly had to hire less
skilled workers. The final factor is that the average number of
hours per job has declined by less among the more skilled, giving
a small positive contribution to labour quality (0.9 percentage
points).
Table 3: Contribution to increase in labour quality (1994-2003)
Annual (percentage Total from 1994 to
points) 2003 (percentage
points)
Change in relative size of different skill levels 1.4 13.2
Change in employment rate of different skill groups 0.0 − 0.4
Change in hours worked by different skill groups 0.1 0.9
Total 1.4 13.6
Table 4 considers the separate effects on labour quality of
increased educational attainment, demographic change and
variation in the proportion of males and females working.
8 By far
the main contribution (12.2 percentage points) to the change
between 1994 and 2003 is the increase in the relative number
of hours worked by the more highly educated groups. Further
decomposition reveals that this has almost entirely reflected the
increase in educational attainment amongst the population,
rather than the more educated increasing their relative average
hours worked or relative employment rates. Changes in the age
composition have had a small positive effect (1.1 percentage
points) on labour quality, reflecting the modest increase in the
proportion of prime age workers and the decline in the number
of hours worked by the, least productive, youngest age group.
The change in the relative proportion of male and female
workers has had no effect on quality.
These results are consistent with the earlier analysis which found
that the influence of educational changes on the employment
and unemployment rate have been much more important than
demographic changes.
8 Although these partial indices inform us of the main drivers behind the increase in labour
quality, they do not sum to the aggregate change, which also depends on interactions
between the factors.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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Table 4: Partial contributions to labour quality of changes in
educational, demographic and gender composition of
the population
Annual Total
Change in educational mix 1.3 12.2
Change in age composition 0.1 1.1
Change in male/female proportion of employment 0.0 − 0.2
The calculations are robust to a number of alternative
assumptions. Using the wage data from the 1994/5 rather than
1999/200 HBS survey marginally increases total labour quality
growth between 1994 and 2003 to 14.3 per cent. If the number
of educational groups is increased from four to five (by splitting
the third level education group into those with and without a
degree), then labour quality growth is reduced to 13.2 per cent.
Given that the increase in labour quality was almost entirely
driven by the rise in educational standards, the results are
unchanged by varying the number of age categories, or by
removing the gender classification.
Labour quality increases over this period have been much more
rapid in Ireland than in either the US or the UK. The US Bureau
of Labour Statistics report that quality increased by an average
of 0.5 per cent between 1994 and 2002. Lau (2002) finds that it
grew by an average of 0.8 per cent per year in the UK between
1994 and 2001. The greater increase in Ireland reflects the more
rapid rate of increase in educational attainment.
7. The Contribution of Labour Quality to
Economic Growth
This section considers how the increase in labour quality has
affected the potential output of the economy. This is the
maximum sustainable amount that can be produced given full
utilisation of labour, capital and technology. Labour quality
matters because any shift in the composition of the work force
towards the more skilled is likely to boost the capacity of the
economy, in the same way that it would be raised by an increase
in the number of hours worked or the capital stock.
Following Solow (1957), and under the assumption of a CES
production function, the standard decomposition of the
contributors to output growth is:
∆ ln Yt =∆ ln At + k ∆ ln Kt + l ∆ ln Ht (equation 4)
where Y is output; K the capital stock;
9 H hours worked; ∆ lnA the
unobservable Solow residual, and α k and α l the income shares of
capital and labour. In this paper, we make the assumption of
9 Calculated in this paper by aggregating real investment expenditure using the perpetual
inventory method under the assumption that the depreciation rate is 4 per cent per year.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
120
constant returns to scale so that α k +α l= 1 and set α l to 0.71, the
average GDP share of compensation to employees and the self
employed over the period 1960 to 2000. The Solow residual
captures the growth of output that cannot be explained in terms
of the growth of inputs, and is a measure of Total Factor
Productivity growth.
If the factor inputs only measure the quantity of capital and hours
worked, then changes in their quality are, by default, absorbed
in the Solow residual. Being able to take account of changes in
labour quality enables us to make a more accurate
decomposition of the determinants of economic growth, with
the Solow residual modified to ∆ lnA*:
∆ ln Yt =∆ ln A
*
t + k ∆ ln Kt + L ∆ ln Ht + L ∆ ln Qt (equation 5)
Figure 21 and Table 5 report the results from using this
methodology to decompose GNP growth between 1994 and
2003. Over this time, total growth averaged 6.4 per cent per
year. The main contribution was from the increase in total hours
worked (2.3 percentage points), while growth of the capital stock
contributed 1.6 percentage points per year. Table 6 gives the
contributions to growth of GNP per adult, which averaged 4.7
per cent over this time. Taking account of population growth
reduces the contributions from both capital and labour to 1.1
percentage points. The increase in total hours per adult between
1994 and 2003 reflects the trends in the employment rate and
in average hours per worker. Average hours fell from 41.7 to
37.9 hours per week, a reduction of 9 per cent. However, this
was more than offset by the increase in the employment rate
from 44.8 per cent to 54.4 per cent, an increase of 21 per cent.
If average hours continue to fall, the employment rate must
continue to rise if hours worked are to continue to make a
positive contribution to growth.
Growth of TFP and labour quality are together estimated to have
made a 2.5 percentage points contribution to GNP growth (and
growth per adult). Of this, labour quality growth accounts for 1.0
percentage points, enabling us to reduce the unobservable TFP
growth component to 1.5 percentage points. Thus, taking labour
quality growth into account substantially reduces the uncertainty
regarding the factors behind output growth.
This decomposition, together with the results presented earlier in
the paper, suggests that the rise in educational standards has
made a very significant contribution to the strength of GNP
growth between 1994 and 2003. The 1.0 percentage points
contribution from higher labour quality almost entirely reflects
the increase in education. In addition, a maximum of two thirds
of the increase in employment reflects the increase in
educational standards, and this is sufficient to more than accountQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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for the aggregate rise in total hours worked. Combining the two
suggests that educational standards could have contributed up
to 2.1 percentage points to the annual growth of GNP per adult
over this period.
Table 5: Contributions to annual GNP growth (1995-2003)
Average growth rate Average
(per cent) contribution to
GNP growth
(percentage points)
Capital stock 5.5 1.6
Total hours worked 3.3 2.3
Labour quality 1.4 1.0
TFP 1.5 1.5
Total = GNP growth N/a 6.4
Table 6: Contributions to annual GNP per adult growth (1995-
2003)
Average growth rate Average
(per cent) contribution to
GNP growth
(percentage points)
Capital stock 3.8 1.1
Total hours worked 1.6 1.1
Labour quality 1.4 1.0
TFP 1.5
Total = GNP growth N/a 4.7
8. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of changes in the
demographic and educational composition of the Irish
population on unemployment, employment and potential supply.
Under the principal economic status (PES) definition, the
unemployment rate in Ireland has fallen from 15.6 per cent in
1994 to 6.2 per cent in 2003. On the ILO definitions, the decline
is from 14.7 per cent to 4.4 per cent. This paper finds that up to
a quarter of the decline using the PES measure reflects the rapid
rise in educational standards, as the more educated tend to have
lower unemployment rates. The effect on the employment rate
has been even larger — at up to two thirds of its rise.
Demographic changes are found to have been much less
important — having a negligible effect on unemployment and
only accounting for a tenth of the increase in the employment
rate. Compared with the domestic population, non-Irish born
migrants have tended to be more educated and more likely to
be of prime working age. But their relatively small size means
that they have only made a small contribution to these overall
trends.
The increase in skills amongst the labour force, largely reflecting
the increase in educational standards, is estimated to haveQuarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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increased the growth of potential output by 1.0 percentage
points per year. Adding the effect of the rise in hours worked
associated with the increase in employment (which we argue
may largely reflect the rise in educational standards) boosts the
total contribution from higher labour input to 2.1 percentage
points. The remaining contribution to average GNP growth per
adult from capital and TFP growth is only 2.6 percentage points,
with TFP contribution 1.5 percentage points. This compares
favourably with the UK, where Burriel-Llombart and Jones (2005)
estimate that TFP contributed about 0.5 percentage points per
year to growth over this period once changes in labour quality
were taken into account. But, although impressive, the Irish
performance is by no means miraculous.
Quantifying the roles played by labour quality and employment
growth may also help us more accurately forecast future GNP
growth. It seems unlikely that the employment rate can continue
increasing by 2 per cent per year. The ESRI (Sexton et al, 2004)
predict an easing in the rate of increase in educational
attainment, with the number of persons in employment with third
level qualifications expected to rise by under a third between
2001 and 2010, compared with more than doubling between
1991 and 2001. This suggests that the rate of labour quality
growth is likely to ease, also putting downward pressure on
potential GNP growth.Quarterly Bulletin 2 2005
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
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Figure 1: PES and ILO measues
of Unemployment
Figure 2: PES and ILO measues
of Employment
10 The following Figures are based upon data from the LFS and QNHS surveys, together with
the author’s calculations. As described in section 2, they are derived using the PES
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Figure 3: Annual GNP Growth and
CPI Inflation
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Figure 5: Estimated Wage by Education
and Age
Figure 6: Age Composition
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Figure 9: Cohort Educational Analysis Figure 10: Migration
Note:
The rate of retention at second level corresponds to 
the estimated percentage of entrants to Junior Cycle in 
a given year who complete second level in a publicly 
aided school with a Leaving Certificate (including 
Leaving Certificate Applied).
Note:
The rate of transfer is estimated by taking the total 
annual intake to all full-time third-level colleges as a 
percentage of the estimated population at age 17.  
Some persons entering third level may have previously 
entered. Mature entrants and entrants from outside the 
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Figure 11: Age Composition of those
Resident in Ireland (2003)
Figure 12: Educational Composition
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Figure 15: Contribution from Different
Age Groups to Change in the
Unemployment Rate
Figure 16: Contribution from Different


































































































































Figure 17: Unemployment Rate by
Educational Group
Figure 18: Employment Rate by
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Figure 19: Contributions from Different
Educational Groups to Change in the
Unemployment Rate
Figure 20: Contributions from Different
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Figure 21: Decomposition of Output
Growth